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This poster paper describes the webinos project and presents
the architecture and security features developed in webinos.
It highlights the main objectives and concepts of the project
and describes the architecture derived to achive the objec-
tives.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The webinos project has a duration of three years (from
September 2010 to August 2013) and is co-funded by the
EU under the FP7-ICT-2009-5 Programme - Objective 1.2.
The project is building an application platform featuring
web components that can be deployed on mobiles, PC, in-car
units and TVs supporting a web runtime, which will support
the rapid creation of innovative and secure web applications,
where:
• applications can be used in several contexts across all
user devices.
• applications can make use of the specific capabilities
and resources that the underlying hardware platform
provides.
• applications can securely access private and non-private
data and other services on the cloud and social web,
as well as data on the user terminal.
• applications are developed once by service providers
and deployed anywhere.
• manufacturers and network operators have a service
platform constituted by open standards and open source,
which satisfies the requirements of the four domains
mobile, PC, Home media and in-car units.
2. PROJECT OVERVIEW
webinos envisions web applications running and utilizing 
resources across a range of connected devices, interacting 
seamlessly with each other to contribute to the development 
of the internet and facilitate users with more attractive, in-
novative and valuable applications.
To achieve this, webinos will define and deliver an Open
Source platform which will extend existing Web technolo-
gies to enable Web applications and services to be used and
shared consistently and securely over a broad spectrum of
connected devices, including mobile, PC, home media (TV)
and in-car units.
This platform will have a concrete implementation that is
accessible to all as an Open Source asset.
2.1 Project objectives
The primary objectives of the webinos project are to:
• Deliver a secure Open Source platform based on web
technologies in the mobile, home media (TV), PC and
automotive domains,
• Define and build, technology proven, key enablers where
such are not available, to facilitate the efficient and
cost effective deployment of applications to converged
devices.
• Define and build a web based application security frame-
work that addresses user and service provider needs,
underlying platform and device requirements and de-
livery and management aspects, which has been tech-
nically proven and is easily deployable.
2.2 Project highlights
The webinos project supports the following key concepts:
• webinos builds on the achievements of the Web com-
munity and extends an open source web runtime envi-
ronment.
• webinos is a federated web runtime that offers a com-
mon set of APIs to allow apps easy access to cross-user,
cross-service, cross-device functionality, in an open yet
secure manner.
• webinos creates open specifications and Open Source
reference implementations that not only show the fea-
sibility of specifications but also simplifies the adapta-
tion by the industry.
• webinos allows discovery of devices and services not
only based on technical, but also on contextual infor-
mation, such as social proximity. The use of social
proximity will also be used to help users find adequate
privacy preferences by aligning them with decisions
made by trusted friends.
2.3 Primary innovations (so far)
To achieve the goal of providing an open, secure, dis-
tributed and cross-domain platform for the easy deployment
of web applications, webinos introduces the following three
primary innovations:
2.3.1 Personal Zones
Devices are registered in Personal Zones, which act as
Overlay Networks and abstract from the underlying physical
networks and protocols.
The Personal Zone provides simple access to local and
remote services, simplifying the task of an application pro-
grammer, allows simple discovery of devices and services,
provides adaptation based on access context and supply com-
munication paths based on trust relationships, decoupled
from underlying technologies.
2.3.2 Personal Zone Proxy
A webinos Personal Zone Proxy acts as stand-in for Mes-
saging, Discovery and Security functions when a device has
no Internet connectivity. It stores information (events, mes-
sages) and synchronises with a central hub once connectivity
is re-established, thus reducing the ’housekeeping’ require-
ments of application developers.
Additionally, the Personal Zone Proxy acts as the pol-
icy enforcement point for the access to device APIs and is
responsible for local discovery and connectivity to non-IP
based devices, such as Bluetooth, ZigBee, NFC and locally
connected devices.
2.3.3 Security Framework
As a secure web platform, webinos started with security
concepts developed for the WAC platform and extended
them for use in a distributed environment. The most signif-
icant feature is the security policy architecture, which pri-
marily controls applications’ access to device features, but
also states rules about inter-device communication and event
handling.
3. ARCHITECTURE COMPONENTS
Users own and use an increasing number of devices. To
simplify the management of those devices and the services
that are used on and by them, webinos uses the concept of
a ’personal zone’. [1].
Devices within a personal zone are authenticated to the
zone, avoiding the need to establish direct peering relation-
ships between individual devices pairs.
The zone also provides a shared model of the context, pro-
viding information about users, device capabilities, proper-
ties and the environment, allowing the synchronization of
devices in the zone in regards to authentication, personal
preferences and service specific data. Since not all devices
will be continously online, the synchronization also is essen-
tial for supporting offline usage.
The personal zone also provides discovery of services and
access to discovered services, including the access to ser-
vices that may only be accessible via intermediate devices,
for example on Bluetooth devices that can only be directly
reached by devices that are in physical proximity.
Personal Zone Hub (PZH)
The Personal Zone Hub (PZH) is the primary element to
handle the requirements to establish a personal zone.[1].
Technically, a PZH is a service and is identified by a URL
and supports a RESTful API based upon JSON RPC. It en-
ables access the Zone’s devices and services for the duration
of a browsing session. It also enables discovery of and access
to devices access by others, subject to the policies that the
owner of the zone has defined.
Figure 1: Main webinos architecture components
A PZH can subscribe to near instant notifications when a
topic (feed URL) the user is interested in is updated.
The PZH also provides support for discovering other hubs
based upon someone’s full name or pseudonym. This is
implemented as a federated discovery process across hubs,
starting from the personal hub. The process is trusted with
access to personal data for ranking purposes, but is designed
to avoid disclosing such data, except as permitted by the
owner’s policies.
Personal Zone Hubs can also be discovered starting from
someone’s email address or phone number. The email ad-
dresses domain name can be used to locate a query service
(typically provided by the domain owner). Note that users
may choose to limit discovery, e.g. to people within a given
group, or to prevent discovery altogether, in which case it is
up to the user to communicate the URL for their Personal
Zone Hub to others as needed.
Personal Zone Proxy (PZP)
A Personal Zone Proxy (PZP) is running on every device
and is responsible for the communication with the PZH.[1].
If access to the PZH is not available, it is the responsibility
of the PZP to act in its place and store relevant information
and events, synchronizing them with the PZH when contact
is re-established.
In addition to acting as a proxy to the PZH, the PZP
is responsible for all discovery using local hardware based
bearers.
Finally, since the external interface to the PZP is defined,
a pseudo-PZP can be used to enable webinos access to de-
vices that cannot implement a full webinos runtime (due to
device limitations or legal reasons), but can use the PZP in-
terface to expose access to services available on that device.
4. WEBINOS DEVICE APIS
Based on a study of scenarios, use cases and requirements
in the first half year of the project, webinos determined a
set of needed device APIs. If existing APIs matched the
requirements of the project, these APIs were used. If there
were specific needs that were not already covered by existing
APIs, the attempt was made to stay as closely to existing
APIs as possible, making modifications and extensions with
as little disruption to the original APIs as possible.[2].
The APIs provided by webinos are: Attestation, Authen-
tication, Context, Events, AppLauncher, Messaging,NFC
(near field communication), Payment, Sensors, Discovery,
TV, Userprofile, Vehicle, WebinosCore, Widget, Devicesta-
tus vocabulary, W3C calendar (*), W3C contacts (*), WAC
devicestatus (*), WAC deviceinteraction (*), W3C Device-
Orientation Event specification (*), W3C File, File Writer,
Directories and System (*), W3C Gallery (*), W3C Geolo-
cation (*), W3C Media Capture (*) (APIs with an asterisk
denote unmodified, referenced APIs)
The application executing on top of the runtime will ac-
cess the API via a JavaScript binding. However, this will
not directly access the underlying device functionality, but
communicate the request to the PZP via a JSON RPC call.
The PZP is implemented as node.js code, providing the ac-
tual access to the device features and services.
Figure 2: Access to APIs via PZP
This approach provides the following advantages:
• All API calls pass through a single interface, which
can then beAttestation used as a Policy Enforcement
Point (PEP) by the policy and security framework,
mediating access to the APIs.
• Since a RPC interface is defined for all API functions,
provideing access to APIs on remote devices is not sig-
nificant different from access to local APIs, aiding de-
vice interaction and interoperability.
• Since the device specific code is primarily in the PZP
and the communication to it is based on standard pro-
tocols, the need to extend the browser or web runtime
is diminished, aiding portability of the webinos envi-
ronment.
5. WEBINOS SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
webinos has been designed with security and privacy as
primary goals. There are a number of privacy concerns:
webinos is likely to hold personal information and support
access to sensitive APIs such as geolocation, calendars and
contacts. A comprehensive access control system and intu-
itive privacy controls are therefore essential. From a security
perspective, webinos may be considered a lucrative target
for attack due to the support for a payment API and the
storage of user credentials to access online services. webinos
may also be used in a corporate environment, meaning that
valuable company IPR could be present on a webinos de-
vice. As a result, webinos must protect the integrity of the
platform and provide secure storage of user and application
data.
Additionally, webinos aims to become an ubiquitous soft-
ware platform, much like the web browser. This means that
a successful attack on the system could potentially affect all
devices using it. This, in combination with the inevitable
complexity of such systems, is known as the middleware
problem [3]. Another problem requiring novel privacy con-
trols is the management of context : information about a
user’s location, activities, nearby devices and social graphs.
This can bring huge benefits, adapting the user experience
depending on their environment, as well as creating new
connections between friends and local services [4]. However,
there is a tension between the use and storage of contextual
data and personal privacy – how can users gain the benefits
of one without losing the other?
The webinos project has tackled these issues through two
activities: a study of user expectations of security and pri-
vacy and the development of a comprehensive security ar-
chitecture.
The study of user expectations involved carrying out sev-
eral security and usability analysis activities. Several per-
sonas [5] were created to describe archetypical behaviour
that target webinos users might carry out. These personas
were derived from a variety of different data sources and
contextualised using scenarios for the different social con-
texts where webinos applications might be used. They rep-
resent end-users, application developers, and people who,
while not end-users of webinos, are likely to be affected by
it. These perspectives were important because, unlike tra-
ditional middleware which is usually exposed only to ap-
plication developers, end-users are expected to assert their
own security and privacy expectations when managing their
personal zones.
As well as informing usability considerations of webinos,
personas were also developed to envisage the different ways
webinos might be attacked. These attacker personas were
grounded in open source threat analysis data [6, 7], and
published case histories on convicted hackers [8]. To vali-
date the attacker personas, misuse cases [9] were created to
explore whether these attackers have both the capabilities
and motivation to exploit different aspects of the webinos
platform.
The resulting security architecture can be divided into the
following overlapping areas:
5.1 Access control policies for applications
webinos applications will, in line with current standards,
require explicit permissions to access the device resources,
but takes this further by integrating privacy policies which
govern how applications promise to use data they request ac-
cess too. After permissions are granted, access control rules
are automatically generated in XACML. These can then be
extended to include rules about sharing data between appli-
cations, users and devices. webinos will synchronise policies
between all devices in the personal zone so that users do not
have to make the same decisions repeatedly.
5.2 Personal zone communication
Each personal zone hub will act as a certificate author-
ity for the zone, issuing certificates for individual proxies.
Communication between any device on the zone will then
be mutually authenticated and encrypted using standard
Transport Level Security. The personal zone hub will make
sure that each device has a copy of all known certificates,
so that peer-to-peer communication is supported. In the
event that a device is lost or stolen, the hub can be accessed
remotely to revoke certificates and remove it from the zone.
5.3 Inter-zone communication
webinos devices in one personal zone will be able to com-
municate with those in other zones through a combination
of certificate exchange and device pairing mechanisms to en-
sure that identities are established securely without relying
on any trusted third parties.
5.4 Runtime protection
The webinos platform is being designed with robustness in
mind. This means following best practices in secure devel-
opment, as well as taking steps to ensure that each software
instance is not compromised. This may be achieved through
the attestation API which can report to trusted parties (such
as the PZH) whether or not a webinos device is running soft-
ware with the latest patches installed. Runtime components
will also be isolated from each other as much as possible.
5.5 Secure storage
Several types of stored data in webinos require protection,
including access control policies, credentials, keys and user
context data. webinos will take advantage of local device
features to encrypt this data, minimising the cost of a mobile
device being lost or stolen. [10]
6. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK
In its first half year, webinos has been studying the re-
quirements for a web runtime that supports cross-device,
cross-domain applications, is secure by design, can be pro-
vided as Open Source software and is highly portable.
In the second half year, webinos specified a system based
on those requirements, defining a basic architecture, key el-
ements to enable the requirements and a set of APIs.
The next half year of webinos will be dedicated to provide
an implementation of the webinos system and the provi-
sion of example, proof of concept and showcase applications,
before re-evaluating and refining the system in the second
phase of the project.
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